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Netherlands Antilles Tax Treaty:
What Were the Costs of Ending
Treaty Shopping?
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 1987 the United States Treasury Department termi-
nated the United States-Netherlands Antilles Tax Treaty (the
"Treaty").' The United States and the Netherlands Antilles had at-
tempted to preserve the Treaty for eight years. However, negotiations
ended because of a loggerhead over the extent to which the Netherlands
Antilles would maintain any tax haven status. Termination of the Treaty
was a victory for the United States since third parties to the Treaty could
no longer misuse it to evade United States taxes. Furthermore, the ter-
mination significantly advanced the continuing United States policy to
eliminate "treaty shopping."' The manner, however, in which the Treas-
I Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes, Apr. 29, 1948, United
States-Netherlands, 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855, as amended; Protocol Supplementing the Con-
vention for the Purpose of Facilitating Extension to the Netherlands Antilles, June 15, 1955, United
States-Netherlands, 6 U.S.T. 3696, T.I.A.S. No. 3366, as extended; Convention on Double Taxation
of Income, Extension to Netherlands Antilles of Convention of Apr. 29, 1948, Nov. 10, 1955, United
States-Netherlands, 6 U.S.T. 3703, T.I.A.S. No. 3367, as amended; Protocol Modifying and Supple-
menting the Extension to the Netherlands Antilles of the Convention of Apr. 29, 1948, Oct. 23,
1963, United States-Netherlands, 15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5885, as supplemented; Convention
Modifying and Supplementing the Convention of Apr. 29, 1948, Dec. 30, 1965, United States-
Netherlands, 17 U.S.T. 896, T.I.A.S. No. 6061 [hereinafter Treaty].
2 Multilateral Treaties Seen as Effective Tool in Preventing International Tax Abuses, 179
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) G-3 (Sept. 17, 1987)[hereinafter Multilateral Treaties].
"Treaty shopping" is the practice whereby an investor in a nation that is not party to a tax treaty
with, the United States looks to invest in the United States through a country that is a party to a
favorable tax treaty with the United States in order to reduce or eliminate his tax liability on his
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ury Department handled the termination incurred a number of costs.
First, the abrupt announcement unnecessarily upset the international
bond market. Second and perhaps more significant in the long term, the
unilateral termination undermined United States credibility as a treaty
partner.
The Treaty addressed numerous areas of taxation, including patents
and copyright royalties, and exemptions of governmental wages, salaries,
and pensions. However, the Treaty's most significant provision was Arti-
cle VIII, entitled "Rate of Tax on Dividends and Interest Derived from
Treaty Country" and its ancillary provisions (collectively, "Article
VIII"). Before 1984, the United States imposed a general 30% withhold-
ing tax on corporations which issued and paid interest on bonds (the
"30% withholding tax" or "withholding tax"). Article VIII of the
Treaty exempted bond issuers, which were foreign subsidiaries of United
States corporations, from the 30% withholding tax. Moreover, the
Netherlands Antilles did not tax payments made to foreign investors.
Consequently, United States corporations widely used the Netherlands
Antilles as a "conduit" to raise money cheaply. 3 A United States corpo-
ration would establish a finance subsidiary in the Netherlands Antilles
and, through the subsidiary, issue bonds which were free from both do-
mestic and Netherlands Antillean taxes.
In June 1984, Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
("DEFRA"). DEFRA repealed the 30% withholding tax for all new
Eurobonds. This repeal made the Treaty's exemption from the withhold-
ing tax no longer necessary for bonds issued after the date of enactment,
July 18, 1984. United States corporations now could issue new bonds
directly to foreign investors, rather than through subsidiaries such as
those in the Netherlands Antilles. Furthermore, to avoid retroactive tax-
ation of bonds issued before 1984 ("pre-1984 bonds"), DEFRA con-
tained a "grandfather clause" for pre-1984 bonds. This grandfather
clause, coupled with the Treaty, preserved the tax haven status of the
Netherlands Antilles. Thus, holders of pre-1984 bonds fully expected
their bonds to remain tax-free. Termination of the Treaty on June 29,
1987, however, immediately subjected pre-1984 bonds to the 30% with-
holding tax.4
United States investments. See infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text. See also Marr, Domestic
Versus Euromarket Bond Sales: A Persistent Borrowing Cost Advantage, 36 TAX NOTES (Sept. 28,
1987)(available on microfiche data base Doc. No. 87-6021).
3 Treasury to Seek Rule Protecting Antilles Bonds, Wall St. J., July 3, 1987, at 5, col. 4 [hereinaf-
ter Protecting Antilles Bonds].
4 Id. See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House
of Representatives., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 345 (1987) (statement of Alan W. Granwell, partner,
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The immediate cost of the United States termination of the Treaty
was its negative effect on the international bond market. Institutions all
over the world that had issued or bought pre-1984 bonds remonstrated,
because the Treasury Department had "chang[ed] the rules of the game"
before the bonds matured.' Moreover, panic selling in the Eurobond
market ensued, because the termination subjected the interest on approx-
imately $32 billion of pre-1984 bonds issued through the Netherlands
Antilles to the withholding tax.6 Finally, many bond issues contained
call provisions which permitted the issuer to redeem the bonds if a with-
holding tax was imposed.7 Such provisions allowed the issuers to call in
the obligations at par value. Since the bonds actually had been selling at
a premium, issuers who called their bonds and refinanced loans at lower
rates received a windfall, while investors bore the loss.'
The strong resistance to announcement of the Treaty's termination
made the Treasury Department realize it had failed to contemplate the
legal problems which would arise in the international bond market.9 The
Treasury Department saw that it needed to re-establish expectation inter-
ests regarding pre-1984 bonds, yet it was unwilling to relinquish its suc-
cess in defeating the tax haven tactic known as treaty shopping. On July
2, 1987, the Treasury Department announced that it would propose leg-
islation which would guarantee the withholding tax exemption for pre-
1984 bonds. Furthermore, because passage of such legislation appeared
uncertain, on July 10th, the Treasury Department announced that it
would specifically preserve Article VIII but would terminate all other
provisions of the Treaty.°
The Treasury Department's handling of termination of the Treaty
highlights the inherent tension between two fundamental government
policies. On one hand, the United States government must raise revenue
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, and former international tax counsel, U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment)[hereinafter Granwell Statement].
5 Treasury Reverses Decision on Taxing Antilles Bonds, Washington Post, July 3, 1987, at G7,
col. 1.
6 Protecting Antilles Bonds, supra note 3.
7 Letter from Paul M. Butler, Jr., Shearman & Sterling, to J. Roger Mentz, Assistant Secretary
for Tax Policy, (July 6, 1987); 36 TAX NoTEs (July 27, 1987)(available on Tax Notes microfiche
data base Doc. No.87-4551) [hereinafter Butler Letter].
8 Protecting Antilles Bonds, supra note 3.
9 Rosen, Treasury's Blunder in Paradise, N.Y. Times, October 4, 1987, at Fl, col. 5. J. Roger
Mentz, at the time Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, indicated that he thought the "market
had taken the possibility of a treaty into account by building a price into the bond for such a contin-
gency." Id. However, the possibility of bond calls was not identified, and it seemed that no in-
dependent study of the effect of the termination of the treaty on the bond market was made by the
monetary branch of the department. Id.
10 Id.
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and compel tax compliance. On the other hand, monetary policies re-
quire a free flow of capital across national borders. These concerns con-
flict, because increased taxes and compliance procedures necessarily
restrict the free flow of capital. The Netherlands Antilles incident, while
closing down a tax haven, undermined the free functioning of the
Eurobond market. Worse, it may have eroded investor confidence in
United States securities, including the Treasury Department's own issues
to fund the United States budget deficit.1 ' Now, along with general risks
of investment, a foreign investor may have to account for the instability
of the United States tax laws.
The Netherlands Antilles incident also illustrates a growing uni-
lateralism in United States foreign tax policy. Such unilateralism impairs
the United States integrity as a treaty partner. For example, the Dutch
government saw the United States actions as showing disdain for treaty
obligations and violating the spirit of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade.12 Coupled with treaty override provisions such as those in
1986 tax legislation and the Technical Corrections Bill,13 the United
States appears to be favoring a unilateral approach to the resolution of
international tax problems. Many contend that such issues are appropri-
ately addressed within the process of treaty negotiation. 14
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the legal problems aris-
ing from termination of the Treaty. The analysis underscores the diffi-
culty in balancing two conflicting governmental policies: tax-raising
concerns and monetarist goals. The Comment further considers long-
term implications for United States foreign relations which flow from the
Netherlands Antilles incident. The Comment concludes that, given the
acceleration of the United States anti-treaty shopping policy over the
past eight years, termination of the Treaty was an inevitable and neces-
sary step. However, in executing its international tax policies, the United
States cannot proceed as if in a vacuum. Here, the Treasury Department
was short-sighted with respect to the immediate impact of termination on
the Eurobond market, and with respect to foreign perceptions about the
United States credibility as a treaty partner.
Part II of this Comment examines the history of the Treaty and its
11 Id.
12 Dutch Minister Warns Against Unilaterality in Trade Bill, Moves to Override Treaties, 214
DAILY REP. FOR ExECUTIVES (BNA) G-7 (Nov. 6, 1987)[hereinafter Dutch Minister Warns].
13 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). Technical Corrections
Bill, H.R. 2636 and S. 1350, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 112 (1987). Normally a treaty obligation will
not be overridden by Congress. For a discussion of treaty override, see infra, notes 72-78 and accom-
panying text.
14 Dutch Minister Warns, supra note 12.
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role in the development of the Eurobond market. The Treaty provided
the primary access for the United States to the Eurobond market. Its
extensive use over the years as an investment vehicle underlies the pres-
ent financial expectations of the Netherlands Antilles and Eurobond issu-
ers and investors. Part III studies the development of the United States
bilateral tax treaty policy with respect to the Netherlands Antilles. It
lays down the fundamental principles and goals behind bilateral tax trea-
ties, as well as the particular interests the United States and the Nether-
lands Antilles sought to protect through their agreement. Part IV
analyzes the legal issues that were raised through the course of the Treas-
ury Department's efforts to reestablish the position of the pre-1984
bonds. Finally, Part V discusses possible justifications for the Treasury
Department's actions and speculates on the future of both the United
States and the Netherlands Antilles without a tax treaty.
II. HISTORY OF THE TREATY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
EUROBOND MARKETS
The Treaty, which became effective in November 1955, was
designed to relieve United States nationals of the burdens of double taxa-
tion.15 In actuality, it provided United States issuers access to the
Euromarkets, by bringing together domestic corporations which sought
to expand their sources for capital and foreign investors who wanted ano-
nymity and a high rate of return on their investment.1 6
Before the enactment of DEFRA in 1984, the United States gener-
ally imposed a 30% withholding tax on dividend, interest, and passive
investment income paid by United States sources to nonresident aliens
and foreign corporations. 7 The withholding tax effectively prohibited
United States borrowers from directly entering the Euromarkets. To re-
15 Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. on Certain Double Taxation Conventions, re-
printed in 2 TAx TREATiES (CCH) % 5855, at 5838 (1971). States enter tax treaties primarily to
prevent the double taxation of income-that is, taxation of income earned in one country by persons
or corporations residing in another country, where both the country of the source of the income and
the country of the person's residence claim jurisdiction to tax the income. One of the assumptions in
giving up source jurisdiction is that the income will be taxed by the treaty partner. Presumably then,
the treaty partner has granted specific concessions or benefits to the source country or its taxpayers
for the right to tax. Comment, Revenue Rulings 84-152 and 84-153: The End of Treaty Shopping?,
17 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 577, 578, 586 (1985)[hereinafter Revenue Rulings]. See also Osgood,
Interpreting Tax Treaties in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, 17 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 255, 259 (1984); Vogel, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus.
LAW. 4 (1986).
16 Marr, supra note 2, at 33.
17 There is a fundamental notion under international law of taxing jurisdiction at the source of
the income. "Source income" refers to the country in which the income is deemed to have arisen.
Osgood, supra note 15, at 258 n.9.
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main competitive with foreign borrowers, the United States borrower
would have had to "gross up" its payments to the investor to cover the
30% tax withheld at the source. Because the borrower would have to
absorb this amount, the cost of borrowing in the Euromarket was unrea-
sonably high.
The Treaty exempted the 30% withholding tax on dividend, inter-
est, and passive investment payments made by United States corpora-
tions to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations. The Treaty further
provided that interest payments on bonds made by a United States cor-
poration to its subsidiary were tax-free.18 Similarly, Netherlands Antil-
lean law provided that payments made by subsidiaries within its borders
to investors were tax-free. United States corporations took advantage of
these provisions by establishing finance subsidiaries in the Netherlands
Antilles. The subsidiaries would purchase bonds from their United
States parents and issue the bonds to foreign investors. Any interest or
dividends paid by the subsidiary to foreign investors were free of both
United States withholding tax and Netherlands Antillean tax.19
The policy of the United States during the 1960s was to encourage
the use of finance subsidiaries to reach foreign markets.20 Exchange rates
were fixed, and overseas borrowing helped prevent devaluation of the
dollar.21 During this period the Eurobond market developed into a ma-
jor source of capital formation for United States borrowers.22 Borrowers
were attracted to the Eurobond market because entering the market
avoided domestic restrictions and provided an opportunity to broaden
18 Treaty, supra note 1, art. VIII.
19 Under the U.S.-Netherlands Antilles Tax Treaty, dividends received by a Netherlands Antil-
les company from United States sources were taxed at a 15% rate (five percent if the company was a
95% owned United States subsidiary), and interest and royalties were exempt from United States
tax. The Netherlands Antilles imposed only a three percent fax rate on dividend, interest and roy-
alty income received by Netherlands Antilles holding companies. Furthermore, that income which
then passed onto a third country resident was not taxed by the United States. Finally, the dividend,
interest or royalty would not be taxed under the tax laws of the country in which the individual
resided. Thus, the tax burden of an individual who invested in the United States in this manner
would be substantially less than through other methods of investment, i.e. the tax rate on interest
income would be three percent, and the rate on dividends would be 17.55% instead of the statutory
30%. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the Protocol Between the United States and the
Netherlands, Signed October 23, 1963, Modifying and Supplementing The 1955 Extension of the
Netherlands Antilles of the 1948 Income Tax Convention, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) I
5856B, at 5839-8 (1964)[hereinafter Senate Report].
20 Revenue Rulings, supra note 15, at 589.
21 Id. In addition, the government created foreign borrowing incentives through the Interest
Equalization Tax and the Foreign Direct Investment Program. Similarly, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice softened its ruling requirements in determining whether obligations of finance subsidiaries
would be exempt from the U.S. withholding tax. Id.
22 Id. at 587.
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borrowers' markets for securities.2 3 These two factors made the cost of
borrowing in the Eurobond market lower than in domestic markets.2 4
The foreign investor also had a number of reasons to resort to the
Eurobond market.2 5 The typical investor sought anonymity and a low
risk, assured return on his money. Eurobonds were issued in bearer
form, meaning that they were unregistered in the United States and were
simply payable to the holder of the bond.26 Netherlands Antillean finan-
cial secrecy laws and the issuance of bearer notes satisfied foreign inves-
tors' growing desire for financial secrecy.2 7 In addition, the companies
that issued bonds in the Euromarkets were large, well-known, blue chip
corporations from politically and economically stable nations.2 8 Finally,
many of the notes that were issued carried guarantees by the United
States parent company to the investor.z9
Within ten years of the Treaty's adoption, it was recognized as a
valuable bridge to foreign investors, despite its concurrent use as a tool
for tax evasion.30 During the late 1970s, United States interest rates rose
23 Marr, supra note 2, at 4.
24 Id. at 30.
25 A United States citizen is not permitted to earn tax-free income on Eurobonds. Since
Eurobonds are bearer obligations, the United States investors may not hold or sell them without
suffering certain sanctions such as the denial of a deduction for any loss sustained on a sale of the
Eurobonds. The Internal Revenue Code provides some exceptions. For example, pension plans and
other financial institutions may earn tax free income on Eurobonds, not because of the nature of the
investment, but because of the status of the institution. Furthermore, certain other U.S. investors
such as broker-dealers, and persons holding through financial institutions may hold, purchase, and
sell these obligations in the secondary market without suffering a penalty. The obligations may not
enter the United States, and the income on them must be reported. Thus, few Eurobond obligations
should be found in the hands of U.S. investors. Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Government Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, at 30-31 (1987)(statement of 0. Donaldson
Chapoton, Acting Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Department of the Treasury)[hereinafter
Chapoton Statement].
26 Revenue Rulings, supra note 15, at 588.
27 Marr, supra note 2, at 32.
28 Id.
29 These guarantees included the payment of interest, premiums, and principal free of taxes
withheld by the source country although usually the issuer reserved the right to call the bonds if the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined that the payments were not tax-exempt. Revenue Rul-
ings, supra note 15, at 588-89.
30 Residents of third countries which did not have tax treaties with the United States also formed
investment companies in the Netherlands Antilles to take advantage of the favorable tax situation.
These companies held their United States source investments and collected the dividends, interest
and royalties for them. In 1963, the United States and the Netherlands Antilles added a protocol to
rectify this situation. Senate Report, supra note 18.
The protocol increased the United States tax rate on dividends, interest and royalties paid to
Netherlands Antilles investment companies to the full 30% statutory rate. However, the protocol
did not change the 15% and zero percent rates on U.S. source dividends, interest, and royalties paid
to a Netherlands Antilles corporation if (a) the recipient corporation was 100% owned by (1) resi-
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relative to other world interest rates, thus making Eurodollar bonds an
even more attractive investment. When investor demand for Eurodollar
bonds increased, use of the Treaty accelerated. Over the thirty-two year
life of the Treaty, the United States monetary policy bolstered the expec-
tations of domestic issuers and foreign investors in the Euromarket. In
effect, the Treaty promoted a system of capital movements which would
not be easy to overturn.
III. THE TREATY AS PART OF THE UNITED STATES BILATERAL
TAX TREATY POLICY
Bilateral tax treaties, analogous to contractual agreements between
states, establish rules for when a state will relinquish to another state
both its taxing jurisdiction and some or all of its rights to tax revenue. 31
The "bargain" of bilateral tax treaties reflects the policy priorities of the
treaty countries and reconciles their underlying domestic tax laws. 32 Tax
treaties can encourage the international flow of investment capital. For
example, a treaty may ensure that the country of "source" (the country
of the issuer) will not excessively tax income derived from investments,
on the assumption that the country where the investor resides will fully
tax that income.33 By eliminating the source income tax, the treaty
removes a significant disincentive for potential investors to cross their
national borders.
However, the specificity and complexity of bilateral tax treaties
make loopholes easy to find. In particular, residents of countries that are
not party to a treaty may be able to use the treaty to reduce their tax
liability.3 4 Thus, bilateral tax treaties attempt to limit such opportunities
for avoidance and evasion of the taxes which treaty countries attempt to
dents of the Netherlands, (2) Netherlands corporations, or (3) residents of the Netherlands Antilles;
or (b) the income was reduced by a Netherlands Antilles corporation from a 25% owned U.S. sub-
sidiary corporation if less than 60% of the payor's gross income consisted of passive income.
While the United States tried to limit the abuses under the Treaty, it specifically did not remove
a provision that allowed an exemption for Netherlands Antilles companies paying dividends and
interest to nonresidents. The reason for this decision was to protect the United States balance of
international payments by encouraging foreign portfolio investment in the United States. Senate
Report, supra note 18, at 5839-10, 5839-14. See also id. at 5839-9 ("Since it is estimated that a large
portion of the assets held by Netherlands Antilles corporations... [are] held by corporations which
derive 50% or more of their gross income from sources within the United States, it is feared that
repeal of Article XII could cause a substantial liquidation of United States assets held by these
corporations so as to avoid the statutory 50% rule which would be applicable in the absence of the
present convention.")
31 Id. at 8. See also, Osgood, supra note 15, at 259.
32 Revenue Rulings, supra note 15, at 584.
33 Id. at 578.
34 Id. at 584.
Netherlands Antilles Tax Treaty
9:355(1988)
impose. Finally, most treaties contain exchange of information provi-
sions and establish mutual agreement and accommodation procedures
for resolving conflicts concerning the application of the treaty.35
The United States traditionally has valued bilateral tax treaties.
They have provided United States taxpayers with certainty regarding ap-
plication of foreign tax rules, and with reduced foreign taxes on divi-
dends and interest received in the United States from operators abroad.36
Tax treaties have enhanced the competitiveness of United States busi-
nesses abroad. They benefit the United States Treasury Department by
limiting the amount of foreign taxes on United States operations for
which the United States must give credit under foreign tax rules. Fi-
nally, the United States and the countries with which they have treaties
have exchanged much valuable information regarding tax collection
procedures.37
A. The Problem of Treaty Shopping
"Treaty shopping" can be illustrated in two examples involving the
United States as a party to a treaty. First, treaty shopping occurs when a
person, who resides in a country that is not a treaty partner with the
United States, indirectly invests in the United States through a country
that is a treaty party. Second, treaty shopping occurs when a United
States resident indirectly invests in the United States through a treaty
partner. In both examples, the investor takes shelter in the tax haven of
the treaty partner. The investor reduces the tax liability on any income
she might earn, by paying the lower or nonexistent tax rates of the treaty
partner, rather than those of the United States Treaty shopping, the neg-
ative aspect of any bilateral tax treaty arrangement, has been especially
notorious in the case of the Treaty.38
Treaty shopping has several adverse effects on the United States.
The United States loses revenues when an investor whose country is not a
treaty partner takes advantage of a United States -treaty concession (such
as an exemption from withholding taxes), and is not provided with a
corresponding benefit from the investor's country. The United States
also loses revenue when its residents acquire investment earnings abroad
35 Osgood, supra note 15, at 260. Internal tax authorities are dependent on the official assistance
of the other country involved, but that country is only bound to help as provided in the U.S.-Nether-
lands Antilles Tax Treaty. Vogel, supra note 15, at 9.
36 Letter from James A. Baker III, Secretary of the Treasury Department, to Bob Packwood,
Senate Finance Committee Chairman (A1ril 7, 1986), 35 TAX NOTES 304 (April 21, 1986).
37 Id. at 304.
38 See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 2; Revenue Rulings, supra note 15.
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but use a treaty to avoid paying United States taxes. In addition, treaty
shopping undermines the United States leverage to negotiate new or re-
vised treaties with countries whose residents treaty shop. Finally, it ob-
structs efforts to bargain with trading partners for concessions, such as
lower withholding tax rates on income derived by United States citizens
abroad. Without such concessions, United States multinational corpora-
tions may find it difficult to remain competitive internationally.3 9
One of the first steps the United States took to reduce treaty shop-
ping was to include a "limitation of benefits" provision in the 1976 and
1977 drafts of the Model Income Tax Treaties.' Article 16 of both
drafts provided that no exemption from withholding tax on interest, divi-
dends, and royalty payments was available for an enterprise incorporated
by a treaty partner if at least 25% of the enterprise was owned by non-
residents of the treaty partner, and if the treaty partner's own tax on such
income was less than the United States tax.4 1 In 1981, the Treasury De-
partment revised Article 16, so that it was even more difficult for enter-
prises to qualify for the tax exemption. However, in order to maintain
existing, legitimate commercial activity,4 2 the Department provided an
exception for companies whose shares were publicly traded on a recog-
nized exchange.4"
The Treasury Department sought to reduce third-party treaty abuse
by attempting to negotiate Article 16 into existing tax treaties. However,
by June 1983, these efforts proved unsuccessful, and the United States
cancelled eighteen out of nineteen treaties with countries that provided
tax havens. The Treaty, however, was the exception.' In view of the
39 Chapoton Statement, supra note 24, at 28. See also Granwell Statement, supra note 4, at 5.
40 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, May 18, 1976, Treasury Dep't News Release, WS-861
[hereinafter 1976 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxa-
tion and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, May 17,
1977, reprinted in I TAX TREATIES (CCH) 5153 [hereinafter 1977 U.S. Model Income Tax
Treaty].
41 1976 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 40, art. 16; 1977 U.S. Model Income Tax
Treaty, supra note 40, art. 16.
42 Granwell Statement, supra note 4, at 3-4.
43 Article 16 denied a corporation resident in the treaty partner country the benefits of a tax
treaty unless (1) they were more than 75% owned by persons resident in the treaty country and
(2) they did not use investment income from a related company in the other treaty country to pay
obligations owed to nonresidents of the treaty country. Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, June
16, 1981, reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1 5158 [hereinafter 1981 U.S. Model Income Tax
Treaty].
44 The Treaty did not contain a limitation of benefits provision. However, such a provision was
included in the negotiated 1986 Treaty. See infra, notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
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billions of Eurobonds involved in widespread conduit financings under
the Treaty, the Treasury Department was reluctant to cancel it. Instead,
the Department sought to avoid disruption of these investments by con-
tinuing the negotiations with the Netherlands Antilles that which had
begun in 1979 and would continue through June 1987.as
Throughout the 1970s, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") also
tried to reduce third-party treaty abuse. The IRS issued a number of
rulings which challenged the validity of finance subsidiary operations on
audit. Under several theories, the IRS argued that although the
Eurobond obligations in form belonged to the finance subsidiary, but in
substance, they were obligations of the domestic parent and thus subject
to the 30% withholding tax.46
Congress took a preliminary step in limiting the issuance of long-
term bearer bonds by passing the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 ("TEFRA").47 TEFRA imposed stringent registration re-
quirements on obligations and restricted interest deductions. Because
both measures blocked the issuance of bearer tax-free bonds, they limited
bond issuance through the Netherlands Antilles.48
45 Rosen, supra note 9, at F8.
46 One of the theories was that the finance subsidary was inadequately capitalized. See Com-
ment, The Repeal of the Thirty Percent Withholding Tax on Portfolio Interest Paid to Foreign Inves-
tors, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 930, 939 n.36 (1984). Another theory was the "sham" theory. If a
corporation was established in the Netherlands Antilles with no business purpose and with tax
avoidance as its motive for creation, the IRS would disregard the corporation for purposes of tax
exemption. Granwell Statement, supra note 4, at 16-18. Later, the IRS applied a test where the
Treaty benefits would not extend to entities created solely to take advantage of the treaty in a way
which would not otherwise be available. Id. Finally, the IRS applied source income rules to crack
down on conduit financing. It adopted the rationale of Aiken Industries, Inc., 56 T.C. 925 (1971),
that treaty benefits only extend to the beneficial recipient and not to its agent. Id. But see Rev. Rul.
75-23, 1975-1 C.B. 290, declared obsolete in Rev. Rul. 87-80, 1987-35 I.R.B. 5 (The benefits of the
Netherlands Antilles Tax Treaty extended to a Netherlands Antilles corporation which invested in
United States real estate even though the shareholders were not Netherlands Antilles residents).
47 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
(1982)(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)[hereinafter TEFRA].
48 TEFRA denied deduction of interest on unregistered but "registered required" obligations. 26
U.S.C. § 163(f)(1)(Supp. IV 1987). Any obligation qualified as "registered required" unless it was
issued by a natural person, and not offered to the public and had a maturity less than one year. 26
U.S.C. § 163(f)(2)(A)(Supp. IV 1987). An obligation was exempt from registration requirements if
"it is sold under procedures reasonably designed to prevent sale or resale to U.S. persons, it bears
interest payable outside the United States only, and it indicates on its face that U.S. holders are
subject to penalties." 26 U.S.C. § 163(f)(2)(B)(Supp. III 1985). The Treasury Department retained
the right to declare such obligations if found to be used for the avoidance of Federal taxes subject to
the registration requirements. 26 U.S.C. § 163(f)(2)(C). In addition, TEFRA directed the Treasury
Department to establish procedures for ensuring that treaty benefits were received only by those
entitled to them. 26 U.S.C. § 324. For further explanation, see Granwell Statement, supra note 4, at
31-32. See generally, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., GENERAL EXPLANA-
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B. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
Section 127 of DEFRA4 9 contained the provisions that repealed the
30% withholding tax on interest received by nonresident aliens for port-
folio indebtedness from United States borrowers. Without the withhold-
ing tax, there was no need for finance subsidiaries such as those in the
Netherlands Antilles. Under DEFRA, foreign parties could invest di-
rectly in domestic corporations and in Treasury bonds rather than indi-
rectly through finance subsidiaries."
Because DEFRA created an incentive for United States parent cor-
porations to assume the debt of their Netherlands Antillean subsidiaries,
the Netherlands Antilles government risked losing the tax revenue it had
been receiving from parent payments to subsidiaries. 1 In addition,
DEFRA threatened to erode the Netherlands Antillean economy, which
depended heavily on profits from its investment activities. 52 Because of
these potential pernicious effects on the Netherlands Antilles, DEFRA
provided that repeal of the withholding tax was effective only for interest
paid on portfolio debt issued after July 18, 1984, the date of DEFRA's
enactment.53 Although this "grandfather" rule sought to reduce uncer-
TION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF
1982, JCS 38-82, at 189-93 (Dec. 31, 1982).
49 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 495 (1984) (codified at I.R.C.
§§ 163, 864, 871, 881, 1441-1442, 2105), explained in JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D
SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT
OF 1984, JCS 41-84 (Comm. Print 1984)[hereinafter DEFRA EXPLANATION].
50 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS. TAX TREAT-
MENT OF INTEREST PAID TO FOREIGN INVESTORS, at 17-18 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter TAX
TREATMENT OF INTEREST]. The proposed legislation included two provisions recharacterizing pay-
ments made by a United States owned finance subsidiary to third parties in a manner that prevented
the parent company from taking foreign tax credits for taxes paid by the Netherlands Antilles sub-
sidiary. The effect of the provisions was that "U.S. companies that cannot obtain an interest rate
differential in the Eurobond market (relative to the domestic market) large enough to cover the costs
of starting and operating a Netherlands Antilles subsidiary, including taxes that cannot be credited,
will no longer obtain a net advantage from Eurobond issues. Thus the effect... would be to reduce
Eurobonds issued through Netherlands Antilles finance subsidiaries." Id.
51 The Netherlands Antilles received more than $50 million per year in income taxes related to
its international finance activities. Fialko, Closing a Loophole: Corporate Tax Haven in Netherlands
Antilles Is Bracing for a Disaster, Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1982, at 17, col. I.
52 Investment activities on the islands provided 17% of foreign exchange earnings, and seven
percent of employment. Id.
53 DEFRA EXPLANATION, supra note 48, at 392-94, 398. The "grandfather" exemption for
interest payments on existing oblgation issued through Netherlands Antilles finance subsidiaries, or
"'controlled foreign corporations" ("CFCs") would be treated as paid to a resident of the country in
which the CFC is incorporated and thus be covered by the Treaty if certain conditions were met:
1) The interest must be paid by a "U.S. affiliate," defined as a United States person related
(within the meaning of I.R.C. § 482) to the CFC.
2) The interest must be paid on an obligation of such U.S. person which was issued before
June 22, 1984.
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tainty about existing obligations of Netherlands Antilles subsidiaries,
Congress emphasized that "[n]o inference [wa]s to be drawn from this
special relief provision for applicable [controlled foreign corporations
("CFCs")] regarding the proper resolution of other tax issues."54 In
other words, the grandfather rule was not to serve as precedent for the
United States tax treatment of other transactions involving tax treaties or
domestic tax law.
Shortly after the enactment of DEFRA, the Treasury Department
issued regulations and rulings that resolved remaining uncertainties
about the tax status of interest paid to Netherlands Antilles subsidiar-
ies.5" First, in October 1984, the IRS issued two rulings (the "1984 rul-
ings") which identified two transactions that DEFRA did not explicitly
exempt from the withholding tax: interest payments to a Netherlands
Antilles subsidiary by a United States corporation, and interest payments
to a Netherlands Antilles subsidiary by a United States subsidiary of a
foreign corporation. 6 Although these transactions were similar to the
one contemplated by DEFRA's grandfather rule, neither was exempt
from withholding tax under the Treaty.
The 1984 rulings helped to slow the use of Netherlands Antilles sub-
sidiaries for entrance to the Eurobond market. 7 They also left a number
of issues unresolved. Primarily, the rulings did not discuss whether the
parent or its subsidiary was the true obligor in conduit arrangements.5
8
Furthermore, the retroactive effect of the 1984 rulings was unclear. It
was not until almost a year later that the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 85-
3) The interest must be paid to a CFC which was in existence on or before June 22, 1984 and
whose principle purpose on that date was issuing and holding obligations to related persons.
4) The CFC must meet certain requirements concerning maintenance of a specified debt eq-
uity ratio as set forth in revenue rulings issued in connection with the IET.
Id. at 397.
54 Id. at 398. A CFC is a corporation in which more than 50% of the voting interest is owned
by U.S. shareholders on any day in the corporate tax year. I.R.C. § 957(a).
55 Revenue Rulings, supra note 15, at 602. For example, it limited the exemption of the 30%
withholding tax to portfolio interest payments on publicly offered, long term, institutional debt obli-
gations. 26 C.F.R. 35a.9999-5, Q. & A. 1, 8 (1985), reprinted in [1984] 10 FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
5 6856. See also, DEFRA EXPLANATION, supra note 49, at 394 (exemption of bearer debt if sold
under TEFRA registration).
56 DEFRA simply stated that certain existing obligations would be treated as payments of inter-
est to residents of the Netherlands Antilles. DEFRA EXPLANATION, supra note 48, at 397-98.
DEFRA explicitly does not apply to most private loan transactions in which both situations existed.
57 Particular problems existed for transactions in gray areas of the law such as private loan
transactions. However, the Netherlands Antilles persisted as a viable means for investing in U.S.
real estate. Zagaris, The Netherlands Antilles Offshore Sector Examines Its Future, 73 TAXES INT'L
6 (Nov. 1985). One would need to evaluate the business purpose of the relationship, the integrity of
the business transaction, how the loans would be structured, and whether an independent reason
existed for basing an international finance subsidiary in the Antilles. Id.
58 Granwell Statement, supra note 4, at 26.
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163, which stated that the 1984 rulings applied to interest payments
made on obligations issued prior to October 15, 1984."9
The 1984 rulings and Revenue Ruling 85-163 made it clear that the
Department was campaigning against treaty shopping.' Opponents to
these rulings argued that the IRS had gone beyond precedent and had
abrogated treaty rights; 61 yet even they could not question the validity of
the IRS's fight against treaty shopping. Moreover, the rulings were
among the first signals to United States treaty partners that the IRS, and
hence the Treasury Department, could unilaterally abrogate the treaty
obligations of the United States.
C. The 1986 United States-Netherlands Antilles Tax Treaty
The ongoing negotiations between the United States and the Nether-
lands Antilles resulted in their signing a new income tax treaty (the
"1986 Treaty") on August 6, 1986.62 Like the earlier Treaty, the 1986
Treaty epitomized the tension between a matured United States policy of
combating tax-avoidance tactics 63 and a desire to maintain economic and
political ties with the Netherlands Antilles. On one hand, the 1986
59 Rev. Rul. 85-163, 1985 I.R.B. 25.
60 Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381; Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383. Both situations in-
volved common Netherlands Antilles financing transactions, and the IRS's rulings were an attack on
treaty shopping and on established methods of indirect accessing of the Euromarkets. The first
transaction involved a back to back loan within a related group, i.e. between a Swiss parent and its
United States subsidiary and its Antilles subsidiary. The second transaction occurred between a
United States corporation and its Netherlands Antilles subsidiary which made a Eurobond offering.
The IRS found that the Netherlands Antilles subsidiaries did not "derive" the interest payments
from the United States corporations within the meaning of Article VIII(l) of the treaty. The IRS
considered factors like the extent to which the Netherlands Antilles subsidiary had "complete do-
minion and control" over the interest payment, whether the subsidiary was a "mere conduit",
whether the primary purpose of involving the subsidiary was to obtain treaty benefits and avoid U.S.
taxes, and whether the subsidiary lacked "sufficient business or economic purpose" to overcome the
conduit nature of the transaction. Because the Netherlands Antilles subsidiaries were mere conduits,
the transactions were subject to the 30% withholding tax.
61 Granwell Statement, supra note 4, at 28. In addition, "[the rulings] have raised concern
among the treaty partners of the United States as to whether this is an attempt by the U.S. to
unilaterally abrogate its treaty obligations." Revenue Rulings, supra note 15, at 615 n.189.
62 Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Respect of the Netherlands Antilles for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, reprinted in 2 Tax
Treaties (CCH) T 5895 (Aug. 1986)[hereinafter 1986 Treaty].
63 Congress explicitly endorsed and encouraged the Treasury Department's anti-treaty shopping
policy in 1984. "The committee understands that the Treasury Department has adopted a policy, to
be implemented in current and future income tax treaty negotiations, that would limit treaty benefits
to bona fide residents of the treaty country. The committee urges the Treasury Department to con-
tinue that policy and to insist on such a result in treaty negotiations." H.R. Rep. No. 432 (Pt. 2),
98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1343 (1984).
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Treaty contained anti-treaty shopping and exchange of information pro-
visions that followed the United States Model Income Tax Treaty."4
These provisions limited the benefits that investors from non-treaty coun-
tries could receive. On the other hand, the 1986 Treaty seemed to favor
the Netherlands Antilles. The 1986 Treaty contained grandfather
clauses for Eurobond financing issued before the enactment of DEFRA
and for benefits received under the earlier Treaty. Together, these
clauses assured that the Netherlands Antilles would remain a tax haven
for international investment.65 In addition, a loophole that limited the
withholding tax exemption to the treaty partners could be carved out of
the detailed language of Article 16 of the 1986 Treaty.6 6 Some critics
also asserted that the 1986 Treaty could be interpreted in many ways that
would allow otherwise ineligible taxpayers to receive treaty benefits. 67
Finally, the 1986 Treaty enhanced the position of international banks
and institutions which provided wholesale financial services in the
Netherlands Antilles, and it provided benefits for Netherlands Antillean-
based insurance and reinsurance companies.68
Any progress in the United States-Netherlands Antilles negotiations
that the 1986 Treaty represented ultimately proved illusory. Diplomatic
notes of exchange issued at the signing of the 1986 Treaty provided that
64 1986 Treaty, supra note 62, arts. 16 & 26. In addition, Article 16 only required 50% owner-
ship by a treaty partner resident as opposed to the 75% required under the 1981 Model Income Tax
Treaty. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
As evidence of the United States' concessions to the Netherlands Antilles, Article 16 exempted
international mutual funds and qualified real estate companies from the limitation on benefits to
residents of a treaty nation. Control over potential abuses regarding certain portfolio investment and
real property would have to be exercised through the exchange of information provisions in the 1986
U.S.-Netherlands Treaty. Davidson, U.S. Signs New Income Tax Treaties with the Netherlands An-
tilles and Aruba, 35 TAX NOTES 631 (August 18, 1986).
The exemption from the limitation on benefits provisions for international mutual funds pro-
vided that a mutual fund established in one of the contracting states would be entitled to treaty
benefits, regardless of the residence of its owners, if it met certain standards regarding share owner-
ship, fund activities, and the nature and diversification of its investment portfolio. Id. A qualified
real estate company was excepted from the limitation on benefits, because it could receive a waiver
for the second withholding tax on dividend payments it made. 1986 Treaty, supra note 62, arts.
16(6) & 10(5). In addition, it could choose to be treated as a United States corporation under
§ 897(i) of the Federal tax code. Id. at art. 24(6).
65 Id.
66 Article 16(2) reads,
The provisions of paragraph I ... shall not apply if the income derived from the other Con-
tracting State is derived in connection with, or is incidental to, the active conduct by such
person of a trade or business in the first mentioned Contracting State (other than the business of
making or managing investments for such persons, or a related person's account).
1986 Treaty, supra note 61, art. 16(2).
67 Davidson, supra note 63, at 632.
68 Id.
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negotiations would reopen if "legislation is enacted which materially af-
fects the treaty ... in order to assess the impact of the legislation on the
treaty and to negotiate amendments as may be necessary or appropriate
to reestablish a balance of benefits."69 A major reason for the provision
was that the pending 1986 tax legislation contained proposals which
could undermine concessions made to the Netherlands Antilles in the
1986 Treaty.70 Subsequent passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the
"1986 Act") and objections to its passage by the Netherlands Antilles
were never resolved. Consequently, Congress never ratified the 1986
Treaty.71
D. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
The 1986 Act challenged the negotiations of the 1986 Treaty by
promulgating a stringent "branch profits tax" that applied to newly de-
fined treaty shopping situations, regardless of existing income tax treaty
protections.72 The branch profits tax and the treaty override provisions
particularly threatened Netherlands Antillean investment in United
States real estate which, after 1984, became the focus of Netherlands An-
tillean financial activity. The provisions also undermined the efficacy of
the "limitation on benefits" provision of Article 16 of the 1986 Treaty.
69 Communication From the Government of the Netherlands Antilles to the Government of the
United States of America, 36 TAX NOTES (Aug. 8, 1986), (available on Tax Notes microfiche data
base Doe. No. 86 IWS 325)(emphasis added)[hereinafter Communication from the Government].
70 Id.
71 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
72 26 U.S.C § 884 (Supp. IV 1987).
The branch profits tax is an extension of the taxing jurisdiction of the United States over divi-
dends and interest paid by foreign corporations "doing business in the United States." Under sec-
tion 884, a thirty percent tax is imposed on the foreign corporation's "effectively connected earnings
and profits." Id. In other words, the United States branch of a foreign corporation suffers a 30%
tax on the earnings and profits it remits to its foreign parent.
Prior to the enactment of the branch profits tax, the Internal Revenue Code imposed a "secon-
dary withholding" tax on a proportionate share of the dividends of a foreign corporation if more
than half of such income was effectively connected with a United States trade or business. The main
difference between the two is that under the secondary withholding tax no withholding was assessed
until the foreign corporation as a whole actually distributed its profits. Therefore, the United States
branch could remit and the foreign office could make use of the branch's profits without being sub-
ject to the tax. Under the secondary withholding rules a foreign corporation with a United States
branch had a competitive edge over a foreign corporation with a United States subsidiary. The
branch profits tax would eliminate that edge. The tax is not imposed on earnings or profits rein-
vested into the U.S. subsidiary or branch. Id. at § 884(b).
The second aspect of the branch tax is on interest payments made by the branch. Id. at
§ 884(f). Interest paid by the branch itself is "treated as if it were paid by a domestic corporation"
to a foreign recipient, thus making it United States source interest income to the recipient and sub-
ject to a 30% withholding tax, unless exempt by statute or by treaty. Hammer & Roher, U.S.
Branch Taxation: A Venture into the Unknown, 41 BULL. FOR INT'L DOCUMENT'N 3 (Jan. 1987).
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This provision allowed nonresident owners of Netherlands Antilles real
estate companies to enjoy the tax protections of the 1986 Treaty.7 3
The earlier Treaty, like most tax treaties, prohibited the imposition
of a branch profits tax.74  Section 884(e) of the 1986 Act, however, re-
stricts the application of any treaty provisions modifying the branch-
profits tax to those corporations which are substantially connected to the
country with whom the United States has a treaty. Therefore, the full
branch profits tax rate applied in treaty shopping situations.7"
Under the earlier Treaty, income from real estate investments made
through corporations qualified as dividends or interest which were free of
a second-level withholding tax. In addition, gains from the sale of real
estate would qualify as profits, taxable only if they were attributable to
the trade or business through a permanent establishment in the state.
Section 884's treaty override provisions would have eliminated the pro-
posed 1986 Treaty provisions favoring the Netherlands Antilles, because
73 26 U.S.C. § 884(e)(Supp. IV 1987). Basically treating shopping exists unless (1) the foreign
corporation enjoys the status of a "qualified resident" of the other contracting state or (2) the income
tax treaty permits a secondary withholding tax on dividends paid by foreign corporations. See also
Technical Corrections Bill, H.R. 2636, 100th Cong. Ist Sess., at § 112(o) [hereinafter Technical
Corrrections Bill].
74 But see Notice 86-17, 1986-2 C.B. 379, Effect of Branch Profits Tax. The branch profits tax
will not generally be imposed on (1) the complete termination of a foreign corporation's U.S. trade
or business, (2) certain liquidations or reorganizations of a foreign corporation that has conducted a
U.S. trade or business, or (3) § 351 incorporation of a foreign corporation's U.S. trade or business.
This could ameliorate the impact of the branch profits tax on Netherlands Antilles and other foreign
corporations. See Granwell Statement, supra note 4, at 42. See also Notice 87-56, 35 I.R.B. 9
(1987).
The Treaty as well as the 1986 Treaty provided that business profits of an enterprise of one of
the treaty nations could not be taxed by the other state unless the enterprise carried on trade or
business through a "permanent establishment" in the other contracting state. Treaty, supra note 1,
art. III; 1986 Treaty, supra note 62, art. 7. The Internal Revenue Code calls for the tax to be
imposed on profits or earnings "connected with the conduct of trade or business," 26 U.S.C.
§ 884(c), which is a much lower standard than permanent establishment. Presumably, the 1986
Treaty would have prevented such lesser activites (those which would not create a permanent estab-
lishment) from being subject to the branch profits tax. Hammer & Rohrer, supra note 72, at 6.
In addition, the nondiscrimination provisions in both treaties arguably precluded the imposition
ofa brach profits tax. Article XXV of the Treaty provides that the citizens and subjects ofonetreaty
country residing in the other country shall not be subject to more burdensome taxes than the citizens
and subjects of that country. The 1986 Treaty explicitly included permanent establishments in the
nondiscrimination provision. Congressional Records indicate that a treaty with a nondiscrimination
article using the "permanent establishment" language of the 1981 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, as
well as of the 1986 Treaty, precludes the imposition of the branch profits tax. See id.
Finally, many commentators have opined that "older treaties may not prevent application of
the branch level tax on profits ... but such viewpoint would render the nondisclosure provisions
meaningless in a business profit context .... [C]learly the intent [of the negotiators] was to encom-
pass and prevent all discrimination including applications of a branch profits tax." Id.
75 Hammer & Roher, supra note 72, at 11.
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the typical Netherlands Antilles real estate corporation had no local
ownership.7 6
Furthermore, while the 1986 Treaty specifically excepted real estate
corporations owned by nonresidents from the "limitations on benefits"
provision, the Technical Corrections Bill provides that the 1986 Act
"would apply notwithstanding any treaty obligation of the United States
in effect on the date of enactment unless otherwise specified." 77 In addi-
tion, both the Treasury Department and Congress viewed the nondis-
crimination clause of the 1986 Treaty as inadequate to prevent the
imposition of the branch profits tax.78
Through the 1986 Act, Congress clearly stated its position on inter-
national tax relations. It would tolerate only limited treaty shopping. It
wanted an increased tax base and thus had expanded its extraterritorial
taxing jurisdiction. Congress felt the "limitation of benefits" exceptions
for real estate companies should override the 1986 Treaty. Moreover,
Congress felt these exceptions should override any bilateral treaty that
permitted third-party exploitation. In short, Congress favored a policy
of strict tax compliance over a policy of freer capital movements between
nations.
The United States had embarked on a firm unilateral approach to
effectuating international tax policy. This approach would prove some-
what short-sighted, because it distanced treaty partners of the United
States and further isolated the United States in an increasingly interna-
tional financial and commercial system. On the other hand, the strong
stance of the United States could only mean it would take further meas-
ures to tighten its tax policy, including possible abrogation of the Treaty.
Investors in the Euromarkets were warned.
III. ANALYSIS OF LEGAL PROBLEMS FOLLOWING THE
TREATY'S TERMINATION
A. Legal Basis for Termination
The United States gave notice of termination on June 29, 1987,
76 Halphen, Effect of the 1985-1986 U.S. Tax Reform Bill on Foreign Investments in U.S. Real
Estate, 40 BULL. FOR INT'L DOCUMENT'N 115, 122 (Mar. 1986).
77 Technical Corrections Bill, supra note 72, at § 112(y)(2)(C) (emphasis added).
78 Halphen, supra note 74, at 122, n.17. The House Committee Report said, "a branch level [or
profits] tax does not fairly discriminate against foreign corporations because it treats foreign corpora-
tions and their shareholders together not worse than United States corporations and shareholders.
Therefore the Committee believes that permitting the branch tax to override conflicting treaties is
not improper ...." Id.
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which was legal under Article XXVII of the Treaty.7 9 Article XXVII
permitted either contracting party to give a notice of termination of all or
part of the Treaty, with such notice taking effect on the first of January
following the expiration of six months after such notice.80 Hence, the
Treasury Department had to act swiftly when it became clear in early
June 1987 that negotiations with the Netherlands Antilles were flounder-
ing. Notice of Treaty termination had to be given by June 30, 1987, in
order for the termination to take effect on January 1, 1988.81 Any delay
in giving notice would have meant prolonging the existence of the Treaty
and its accompanying abuses for another year.
Not surprisingly, the Netherlands Antilles government objected to
the Treaty termination, basing its complaints on the progress that had
been made on the 1986 Treaty. It argued that, under the diplomatic
notes of exchange which were issued at the signing of the 1986 Treaty,
the United States had promised to restore a "balance of benefits" be-
tween the two governments.8" Thus, by unilaterally abrogating the
Treaty, the United States had reneged on this obligation. However, it is
more realistic to view the 1986 Treaty as an interim draft document
which both parties expected to be significantly altered by the 1986 tax
legislation.83 Therefore, the United States was not subject to a binding
obligation to agree to specific amendments to the 1986 Treaty.84
Not only was the Treaty's termination justified, but the Treasury
Department's subsequent modification of its notice of termination on
July 10, 1987-was well-founded. Past practices in this area justified the
Department's reinstatement of Article VIII until January 1, 1988. Anal-
ysis of the modification of notice of termination involves two considera-
79 Granwell Statement, supra note 4, at 37-38.
80 The United States and the Netherlands formally agreed in September 1987 that all provisions
would terminate January 1, 1988, except for Article VIII and its ancillary provisions. U.S., Nether-
lands Formally Agree to Partial Termination of Tax Pact Applying to Antilles, DAILY REP. FOR
EXECtrrIVES (BNA) G-2 (Sept. 16, 1987).
81 Art. XXVIII(3) states in relevant part, "At any time.., either of the Contracting States may,
by a written notice of termination ... terminate the application of the present Convention to any...
territory to which the Convention, or one of its provisions, has been extended. In that case the
present Convention, the provisions thereof specified in the notice of termination, shall cease to be
applicable... after the first day of January following the expiration of a period of six months after
the date of such notice." Treaty, supra note 1, at art. XXVIII(3)
82 Rosen, supra note 9.
83 Communication From the Government of the Netherlands Antilles, 35 TAX NoTEs 9 (avail-
able on Tax Notes microfiche data base Doe. No. 86 IWS 325).
84 Nauheim & Jacobson, Proposed United States-Netherlands Antilles Income Tax Treaty: New
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tions: whether notice of termination could be withdrawn and whether
part of the Treaty could be terminated. The Treaty did not specifically
state that notice of termination could be withdrawn. However, in 1961,
the State Department's Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs had
responded to a related inquiry, by stating that so long as a notice of ter-
mination had not yet resulted in the termination of an applicable treaty,
such notice could be withdrawn.86
Moreover, the United States had withdrawn notice of termination of
a treaty on two previous instances. On November 6, 1933, the United
States gave notice of termination of an extradition treaty which it had
signed with Greece in 1931. 87 Subsequently the United States withdrew
the notice after the two countries signed a protocol concerning a disputed
article of the treaty. Similarly, on November 15, 1965, the United States
gave notice of termination of the 1929 Warsaw Convention, then with-
drew the notice the day before a six-month notification period under the
Warsaw Convention was to have expired.8 8 In the case of the Treaty, the
Treasury Department's withdrawal of its original notice of termination
was justified, given that such withdrawal was made only a few days after
the Department gave its initial notice and given the continued uproar in
the Eurobond market.
The Treasury Department concluded that it was legal to terminate
only part of the Treaty "as long as the withholding tax exemption for all
interest was retained in the treaty." 89 Its reasoning may have been that
the plain wording of the Treaty allowed selective termination of its provi-
sions.90 If articles of a treaty can be selectively terminated, it follows that
notice of termination of an entire treaty can be selectively withdrawn.9 '
B. Examination of the Solution: Legislation and
Partial Treaty Termination
The Treasury Department's announcement on July 2, 1987, that it
would propose legislation to preserve the withholding tax exemption on
pre-1984 bonds was intended to ease investor concerns.9 2 However, the
announcement proved insufficient to quell the unrest, because the fate of
86 Id., supra note 9.
87 MS. Department of State, File 371.700/10-2461. See Butler Letter, supra note 7.
88 Butler Letter, supra note 7.
89 Treasury's Blunder in Paradise, supra note 9 (emphasis added). Ironically, the proposed legis-
lation sought to limit the tax exemption on interest to pre-1984 bonds. Article VIII was broader in
scope. In fact, the scope of the exemption remains an area of uncertainty.
90 Treaty, supra note 1, at Art. XXVIII(3).
91 Butler Letter, supra note 7.
92 Granwell Statement, supra note 4, at 48.
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the legislation remained uncertain. If nothing else happened and the leg-
islation was not enacted, it appeared fairly clear that the provisions al-
lowing issuers to call in pre-1984 bonds would remain operable.93
Therefore, the Treasury Department modified its termination by reinstat-
ing Article VIII.94 Modification of the notice of termination removed the
legal basis for issuers to exercise the redemption provisions of the
Eurobonds.95
The goal of modifying the notice of termination was to assure inves-
tors of the United States government's commitment to preserve efficient
access to all capital markets.96 Modification and legislation97 recognized
that the legitimate expectations of issuers and holders had been disrupted
and should be restored in order, not only to prevent further disruption if
bonds were called in, but, more importantly, to decrease skepticism
about investing in the United States in the future.98
Once Article VIII was reinstated, the legislation became desirable,
because the exemption under Article VIII was broader than necessary to
maintain the tax exempt status of the Eurobonds.99 The legislation ex-
empts the 30% withholding tax on interest paid to a Netherlands Antil-
les CFC not connected with United States business from sources within
the United States."°
Those applicable CFCs include corporations in existence and incor-
porated in the Netherlands Antilles at all times between October 15,
1984, and the date of the interest payment. The legislation preserves the
United States interest exemption on not only the pre-1984 bonds, but
also Eurobonds issued between the June 1984 enactment and the promul-
gation of the implementing regulations in October 1984. In addition, an
"applicable CFC" entitled to the benefits of the legislation shall not be
treated as engaged in trade or business within the United States with
respect to its qualifying interest if such CFC was not engaged in trade or
93 Treasury Moves Quickly on Eurobond Legislation as Hill Interest in Bill See Growing, 130
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) G-6 (July 9, 1987).
94 Treasury Plan to Alter Antilles Treaty Is Expected to Calm Eurobond Market, Wall St. J., July
13, 1987, at 4, col. 2.
95 U.S. Modifies Antilles Plan to Keep Eurobonds Free of Tax Withholding, Offers Legislation,
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) G-2 (July 13, 1987).
96 Letter from J. Roger Mentz to James C. Wright, 36 Tax Notes (July 10, 1987) (available in
Tax Notes microfiche data base Doc. No. 87-4819).
97 Dutch Minister Warns, supra note 12.
98 The Antilles Heel, Wall St. J., July 15, 1987, at 28, col. 1.
99 Chapoton Statement, supra note 25, at 20.
100 SENATE BUDGET COMM. BILL ON THE PROPOSED OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT
OF 1987, Title VI, Part 1 433 subpart E, § 4541, Treatment of Certain Interest Income of Nether-
lands Antilles CFC's.
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business within the United States through a permanent establishment on
June 30, 1987.101
Several uncertainties regarding the scope and applicability of the
legislation exist.10 2 For example, the definition of "applicable CFC"
raises some technical problems. Under current law, the principle pur-
pose test of lending the proceeds of CFC obligations to affiliates is ap-
plied as of the time of "each interest payment". Under the legislation the
principle purpose test is applied "at all times" since October 15, 1984.
The effect of the difference in wording is that a more stringent standard
applies under the legislation than under DEFRA. This different stan-
dard could prevent a Netherlands Antilles finance subsidiary from quali-
fying as an applicable CFC even in the case where the principle purpose
test failed for only one day. A more practical approach would have been
to parallel the provisions of the 1984 Act by requiring the principal pur-
pose test to be met on each interest payment date. 103
Another problem with the definition of "applicable CFC" is that few
Netherlands Antilles finance subsidiaries issued CFC obligations after
October 15, 1984, and their principle function has been the servicing of
outstanding obligations. Limiting the principle purpose test to "issuing"
might cause those companies which engaged in other financial activities
after the 1984 Act to have their CFC obligations excluded from the pres-
ent withholding tax exemption. °1 Given that part of the rationale for
the 1984 grandfather provision was to maintain some continued protec-
tion for Netherlands Antilles finance subsidiaries who serviced pre-1984
bonds, the insertion of the word "servicing" would be consistent with the
prior legislative intent.
C. Revenue Rulings
In August 1987, the IRS came out with two rulings which dealt
101 Granwell Statement, supra note 4, at 49.
102 Concerns were raised about the scope of the exercise of warrant provision and the rollover
provision. In addition, some voiced a desire to have the legislation enable the parent to take over its
subsidiary's debt or to increase the debt equity ratio requirements. Such decrease in the capital
requirement would make new funds available for U.S. business. See J.C. Penney letter to the Treas-
ury Department, 36 TAX NOTES (Sept. 7, 1987)(available on Tax Notes microfiche data base Doc.
No. 87-5472). The problem with this proposal is that it ignores the economic consequences on the
Netherlands Antilles financial services industry which the spirit of the 1984 Act sought to preserve.
See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
103 Letter from Kenneth Klein of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft to the Treasury Department
(Aug. 24, 1987)(regarding proposed Antilles Eurobond legislation: definition of "applicable CFC's")
36 TAX NOTES (September 7, 1987).
104 Letter from General Motors Corp. to the Treasury Department, 36 TAX NOTES (Sept. 14,
1987).
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with the United States tax consequences of the partial termination of the
Treaty.105 The combined effect of the two rulings was, first, to create
certainty about the status of Eurobond holders after the partial termina-
tion, and second, to underscore the policy that treaty shopping will not
be tolerated.
The first ruling, Revenue Ruling 87-79,"o6 held that Article VIII
would continue to apply after December 31, 1987, the last day that the
rest of the Treaty would be effective, and that the Article VIII exemption
would continue to be limited to situations in which Revenue Ruling 84-
153 did not apply. Revenue Ruling 84-153 related to the loss of treaty
benefits in the case of conduit loans. 117 It also stated that Revenue Rul-
ing 84-163, which made Revenue Ruling 84-153 inapplicable to obliga-
tions issued prior to October 15, 1984, would continue to apply after
1987 to guarantee benefits of Article VIII to a United States corporation
which paid interest to a Netherlands Antilles finance subsidiary. Finally,
it confirmed that provisions of DEFRA, affording treaty protection to
pre-1984 bonds and rollovers of these bonds, would remain fully
applicable.
The second ruling, Revenue Ruling 87-80,108 declared that a 1975
ruling'09 was obsolete, because of the 1986 Act's branch profits tax treaty
override provision, and because of the partial termination of the Treaty.
Article XII of the Treaty provided generally that dividends and interest
paid by a Netherlands Antilles corporation to a recipient not a citizen or
resident of the United States was exempt from United States tax. Reve-
nue Ruling 75-23 held that such payments made by a Netherlands Antil-
les corporation that was a member of a partnership doing business in the
United States were exempt from United States tax under Article XII.
However, starting January 1, 1987, the branch profits tax override sec-
tion took effect for treaty provisions, including Article XII of the Treaty,
in those cases where the recipient or payer of payments was not a "quali-
fied resident" of the treaty country. In addition, qualified residents of the
Netherlands Antilles would be unable to claim the benefits of Article XII
after it terminated on December 31, 1987. Therefore, the 1975 ruling
was obsolete.
Even though the grandfather provision of DEFRA would not apply
105 IRS Advance Announcement 87-76 Released Aug. 12, 1987, 155 Daily Rep. For Executives
(BNA) J-1 (Aug. 13, 1987).
106 Rev. Rul. 87-79, 1987-35 I.R.B. 7.
107 See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
108 Rev. Rul. 87-80, 1987-35 I.R.B. 5.
109 Rev. Rul. 75-23, 1975-1 C.B. 290.
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to them, Revenue Ruling 87-79 declared that conduit attack would not
be applied to pre-1984 bonds. In other words, post-1987 payments of
interest on Eurobonds issued between June 1984 and October 15, 1985
were grandfathered. 10° However, Revenue Ruling 87-80, reemphasized
the interdiction of the use of a treaty-protected entity for treaty shopping
purposes. 1
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TERMINATION OF THE TREATY AND
SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES
WITHOUT A TREATY
A. Culmination of the Campaign Against Treaty Shopping
The preceding analysis of the development of the United States'
stance against treaty shopping shows that, from a tax policy standpoint,
the Treasury Department's decision to terminate the Treaty had merit.
The decision was entirely consistent with various past policies of the
United States that attempted to combat treaty shopping without cancel-
ling the Treaty. For eight years, the Treasury Department had tried to
negotiate a more restrictive treaty with the Netherlands Antilles. A ne-
gotiated treaty would have been premised on the anti-treaty shopping
criteria in the Model Income Tax Treaty. In addition, the negotiations
were accompanied by increasingly hostile Congressional directives
against treaty shopping and by stringent IRS revenue rulings. The
stances of both the executive and legislative branches were intolerant of
any treaty shopping. When measures such as restrictive revenue rulings,
legislation, and narrowly constructed treaties proved ineffective, termina-
tion of the Treaty was the only remaining choice.
Nevertheless, the Treasury Department's notice of termination un-
necessarily upset the international bond market. The Treasury Depart-
ment did not consider the effect of its decision on the Eurobond market.
That information would not have been difficult to assess if the Treasury
Department had consulted its monetarists.I12 In addition, a simple ex-
amination of the history of the Treaty would have revealed the important
role Eurobond investments should have played in any decision regarding
the status of the Netherlands Antilles. The staggering amount of out-
standing Eurobonds was a major reason for prolonging the use of indi-
110 Granwell Statement, supra note 4, at 51.
III Id. at 52.
112 Rosen, supra note 9. "[H]ad the monetarists been apprised of the decision to terminate the
Antilles treaty, they would have objected. By bypassing the monetarists, the deed was done." Id.
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rect methods of fighting treaty shopping and for drawing out the treaty
negotiations for eight years. Similarly, tax concessions which had been
granted, for example, in DEFRA, as well as a general historical build-up
of investor expectations regarding the viability of these investments, 13
should have alerted the Treasury Department to the expectation interests
of investors, issuers, and the Netherlands Antilles.
The Treasury Department could have avoided upsetting the
Eurobond by partially terminating the Treaty in the first place.114 In
doing so, it would not have contradicted with an established monetary
policy which was carefully orchestrated to permit a free-flow of capital
across borders, and whose primary purpose was to enable the Adminis-
tration to borrow in foreign markets free of restrictions which might
erode investor confidence. 115 Instead, the Treasury Department had to
adopt reactionary measures to reestablish the interests in the Eurobond
market which it never intended to disrupt. Such reactionary steps only
served to further undermine investor confidence in United States invest-
ments. 1 6  The solution of partial termination and legislation still poses
uncertainties as to the scope of investments which will be exempt from a
withholding tax.117 However, once the legislation is enacted, it should
govern rather than Article VIII, because its promulgation is later in time
than Article VIII and its content is more specific than Article VIII. Fi-
113 See Letter from Ren6 Jaquet, vice Chairman, The Association of International Bond Dealers,
to James C. Baker, III, Secretary of the Treasury (July 8, 1987) 36 TAX NoTEs (August 10, 1987)
(available on Tax Notes microfiche data base Doc. No. 87-4939). "Since 1963, U.S. corporations
were encouraged to raise capital overseas and the accepted vehicle to do so was the Netherlands
Antilles finance subsidiary. The markets concluded that the role played by such subsidiaries was
entirely consistent with U.S. government policy. In consequence, the markets absorbed larger and
larger amounts of debt issued by the Netherlands Antilles subsidiaries of U.S. corporations." Id. If
this is true then the markets are not necessarily an accurate reflection of United States policy, for
DEFRA sent a very clear message that only certain debt obligation issued by Netherlands Antilles
finance subsidiaries were condoned.
114 Apparently, the Treasury Department looked into the possibility of partial termination early
in 1987, and concluded that it would not be legal. However, the investigation never reached the
upper decisionmaking levels of the Department. Rosen, supra note 9. The Article comments that
cynics say the partial termination became legal only because the Treasury Department was forced to
do it. Id.
115 Id.
116 See supra notes 9-11.
117 The Dutch view Article VIII of the 1986 Treaty as fully effective and not limited to
Eurobonds (to which the U.S. legislation limits the exemption). The position is based on the ex-
change of notes between the U.S. and the Netherlands Antilles in which representatives of both
governments indicated that neither government intended to terminate Article VIII and its ancillary
provisions. Dutch Believe Article VIII of Partially Terminated US. Netherlands Antilles Tax Treaty
Is Fully Operable, 37 TAX NoTEs (Feb. 8, 1988).
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nally, the Treasury Department's handling of the Netherlands Antilles
incident undermined United States credibility as a treaty partner.
B. Foreign Policy Aspects
The United States unilateral termination of the Treaty is one of sev-
eral recent unilateral steps taken with regard to foreign affairs. The cu-
mulative effect of these measures has been to weaken the United States
position in international affairs. The override provision in the 1986 Act
branch profits tax and the even more stringent override provision in the
Technical Corrections Bill are signals to both existing or potential treaty
partners that treaty agreements are secondary to Congressional acts.118
In addition, the pending trade bill11 9 is unilateral in spirit, and has the
European Community worried that "everything is done unilaterally."1 20
Such unilateral behavior is the antithesis of successful foreign relations.
The United States, in the long run, can only hurt itself by showing a
disdain for international solutions to problems. For example, with re-
spect to the Netherlands Antilles, without a tax treaty the United States
gives up its legal basis for tax cooperation with the Netherlands Antilles
government. 121 The United States now could be at a disadvantage in
administering tax compliance procedures in the Netherlands Antilles.
Termination of the Treaty and its negative impact 122 on the Netherlands
Antilles economy will only make the Netherlands Antilles less coopera-
tive in the future. 1
2 3
With the termination of the Treaty, the United States hopefully has
118 While this phenomena is perfectly legal and not a new consideration for treaty partners, in
practice Congress does not explicitly override treaties. Treaty override appears to be a greater in-
fringement on executive treatymaking power than merely having the Senate role in the treatymaking
process.
119 Under the bill, opportunites for companies to bring trade actions to the Administration would
be expanded, and the President's authority to decide not to act on these would be restricted. Dutch
Minister Warns, supra note 12.
120 Dutch Minister Warns, supra note 12.
121 Statement of Bruce Zagaris Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary
Affairs of the Committee on Government Operations, 36 TAX NOTES (Sept. 21, 1987)(available on
Tax Notes microfiche data base Doc. No. 87-5917).
122 One of the major blows to the Netherlands Antilles economy without the treaty will be to real
estate investment companies which will be subject to the branch level tax. These companies proba-
bly will be reorganized to avoid the tax. See CURAqAO INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY N.V.,
NEWSLETTER (August 8, 1987)(available in the offices of Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.). The Nether-
lands Antilles has also amended its tax laws in order to secure the tax-exempt status of Netherlands
Antilles firms holding direct or indirect foreign real property interests. This legislation is designed to
provide a continuation of the benefits of Article V of the Treaty. Turro, Netherlands Antilles Legis-
lates to Ameliorate U.S. Tax Treaty Termination, 36 TAX NOTES (Nov. 23, 1987).
123 Turro, id.
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ended its long battle against treaty shopping. Winning the battle has not
been without costs. Furthermore, these costs could have been reduced
with more prudent planning and an ear to other interests at stake. With
every battle, there are lessons to be learned. Adoption of the lessons
from the Netherlands Antilles incident would make for a less disruptive
tax policy in the future.
Frith Crandall
